We study the role of executive functional background in explaining management discretion in financial reporting. Taking goodwill impairment as our reporting setting, we focus on top executives (CEOs and CFOs) whose employment history includes experience in investment banking, private equity, venture capital or management consulting, as we expect these executives to have unique human capital and reputation concerns with respect to acquisitions and valuation modeling related to fair-value reporting. On average, we document that CFOs with prior transaction experience impair goodwill more frequently and in smaller amounts than other executives. Further investigation suggests that CFOs with prior transaction experience report goodwill that is more value relevant. This is consistent with CFO valuation expertise helping impair goodwill in a more informative manner. In contrast, CEOs with prior transaction experience appear to be subject to agency conflicts that affect their propensity to impair goodwill. Overall, our results not only suggest that executive functional background is a significant explanatory factor of financial reporting discretion, but also that a better understanding of its effect relies upon analyses of specific settings and predictions grounded in upper echelons theory and agency theory.
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INTRODUCTION
How does a top executive's prior professional experience influence his or her reporting choices?
A recent strand of empirical literature documents that manager fixed effects explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in corporate outcomes such as investments (Bertrand and Schoar 2003) , financial disclosure (Bamber et al. 2010 ) and financial reporting . The overarching conclusion from those papers is that individual executives have distinct "styles" which influence their organizations' outputs. Yet, little is known about which managerial characteristics contribute to different management decisions. Our goal is to provide evidence on the impact of managerial background on financial reporting discretion.
We exploit executives' past professional experience as a possible and observable source of variation in financial reporting decision-making. In particular, we focus our attention on top executives who, at some point in their careers, had prior transaction experience in (1) investment banking (hereafter "IB"), (2) management consulting ("hereafter MC"), or (3) private equity or venture capital (hereafter "PE/VC"). We investigate these executives' actions in a financial reporting setting that focuses on goodwill and impairment thereof. Since goodwill is highly subject to managerial discretion (Ramanna and Watts 2011) , it is a particularly cogent accounting number to analyze management transaction expertise and reporting choice. Indeed, goodwill-and the impairment thereof-is a function of expected cash flows that depend in part on managers' knowledge and actions. It is also an economically significant financial statement item (KPMG 2011).
We expect two main competing phenomena to affect the goodwill reporting of executives with prior transaction experience. Holding economics and incentives constant, we argue that goodwill is likely to be influenced by the valuation expertise of top executives. Indeed, the measurement of goodwill is a complex process that requires a high degree of judgment and knowledge on the executive's part. We consider executives with prior transaction experience to be comparatively more acquainted with the complexity of the financial reporting and capital market consequences of goodwill, given their prior focus on valuating corporate entities. Accordingly, we expect goodwill to exhibit greater incremental value relevance 1 when top executives have greater expertise in the domains of valuation and mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, an executive with prior transaction experience is unlikely to be immune to agency conflicts that affect financial reporting choices involving discretion and may also be subject to personal incentives such as maintaining a reputation related to his or her background. We expect executives with prior transaction experience to be more likely to worry about maintaining their reputations in the marketplace regarding their ability to negotiate and manage acquisitions, which is likely to have a mitigating effect on their propensity to report timely and informative goodwill impairments.
We obtain the employment history of CEOs and CFOs of 2,168 publicly listed U.S. firms over the [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] period, which corresponds to a single accounting regime for acquisitions and goodwill (SFAS 141 and 142) . 2 We first examine the role of functional background in explaining goodwill impairment decisions. Controlling for various economic determinants of goodwill impairment and for managerial ability, we find that CFOs with prior transaction experience are significantly more likely to impair goodwill. 3 With a marginal effect of 6.2% compared to the unconditional probability of impairment of 8% in the full sample, the impact of CFOs with prior transaction experience is economically significant.
We then interact executive functional background with proxies for agency frictions. First, we test whether greater monitoring from other experts affects the impairment decisions of executives with prior transaction experience. Our results indicate that CEOs with prior transaction experience are significantly more likely to impair goodwill when (i) there is at least one director with prior transaction experience on the board or (ii) sell-side analysts are downgrading their recommendations for the stock than they are 1 For succinctness, we often use the term "value relevance" when referring to the predictive ability of goodwill for future cash flows (measured by absolute forecast errors) and to its explanatory power for stock prices (measured by incremental R 2 in regressions based on the Ohlson [1995] model). 2 Removing the adoption year of 2002 from our sample because of possible effects due to transition rules (Beatty and Weber 2006) does not affect our results. 3 Throughout the paper, we primarily compare the executives of interest to the "average manager" rather than to each other; that is, we are less interested in issues such as whether IB executives are more likely than PE/VC executives to impair goodwill. However, as a robustness check, we also compare the impairment choices of the executives of interest to those of former auditors, lawyers and top executives of firms that engage in substantial M&A. We find that CFOs with prior transaction experience are significantly more likely to impair goodwill and to be associated with incrementally informative impairments than those other groups (not tabulated). without these monitoring agents. This suggests that, when internal or external governance agents are also transaction experts, CEOs are less likely to withhold impairment decisions.
Next, we test whether the propensity to impair goodwill varies depending on whether the impairment is more or less likely to be incrementally costly in terms of reputation or career outcomes for executives with transaction experience. We find that CEOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill when (i) they are in the first year of their appointment or (ii) pre-impairment income is already lower than zero and lower than last year's income, consistent with a "big bath" behavior. Overall, the results suggest that CEOs with prior transaction experience are more sensitive to agency conflicts when it comes to their goodwill impairment decisions. In contrast, CFOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill regardless of the aforementioned proxies for agency conflicts. Insofar as CEOs are held accountable for acquisition performance, this is consistent with reputation affecting CEOs more than CFOs in their reporting choices.
Having looked at determinants of goodwill impairment decisions, we test our valuation expertise hypothesis by looking at the value relevance of goodwill and impairment thereof. Our results indicate that goodwill impairment exhibits greater incremental value relevance in firms where the CFOs have prior M&A expertise than in other firms. Indeed, absolute forecast errors for two-year-ahead cash flow from operations, free cash flow and EBITDA using current assets and net income as predictors decrease to a significantly greater extent when we add a goodwill impairment indicator variable and interact it with net goodwill and net income in firms whose CFOs have transaction experience. In terms of economic significance, the incremental predictive ability of goodwill impairment accuracy for future EBITDA or free cash flow is higher for firms that have a CFO with prior transaction experience by about 0.50% of total assets, compared to firms that do not have any executive with prior transaction experience. Similarly, the incremental R 2 associated with goodwill impairment in a regression of stock price on book value of equity and net income is significantly higher in firms that have CFOs with prior transaction experience.
CEOs with prior transaction experience are not significantly associated with any incremental value relevance for goodwill impairment.
We perform robustness checks and additional tests to deepen our understanding of the relationship between functional background and goodwill reporting. We use a propensity-score matching procedure to control for firm characteristics associated with the likelihood that a firm's CEO or CFO has prior transaction experience. Our main results continue to hold when we compare firms with executives with prior transaction experience to firms matched on propensity score. We also restrict our sample to firms that hire an executive with prior transaction experience at some point during our sample period, and continue to find qualitatively similar results. In terms of additional tests, conditioned upon an impairment being taken, we find that CFOs with prior transaction experience report relatively smaller impairments.
To the extent that large impairments are untimely (Li and Sloan 2011) , this result is consistent with CFOs with prior transaction experience reporting more frequent and timely goodwill impairments. Furthermore, we find that CEOs, but not CFOs, with prior transaction experience are more likely to use goodwill impairments to smooth earnings. We also examine executive turnover and find that CEOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to quit their position within two years of their taking an impairment, which lends additional support to the idea that career concerns affect their impairment behavior.
Our study contributes to the literature by furthering our understanding of how individual CEOs and CFOs matter in shaping organizations' financial reporting choices. Prior studies show that, on average, managers do have an impact on voluntary disclosure (Bamber et al. 2010 ) and financial reporting ). In addition, Bamber et al. (2010) provide evidence on the association between executives' functional backgrounds and properties of their earnings forecasts. However, while CFOs with financial expertise have been found to be less likely to restate earnings (Aier et al. 2005) or to receive initial adverse SOX 404 opinions (Li et al. 2010) , Ge et al. (2011) find little evidence that CFO background explains accounting choice. We extend this strand of literature by linking executives' past professional experience to financial reporting choice in an economically meaningful way. Indeed, while the notion of managerial style can be elusive and difficult to trace to individuals' attributes, the link between managers' transaction expertise and the goodwill reporting choices of the firms they 5 subsequently work for is traceable. Our results not only suggest that CFO background does matter, but that a better understanding of how it matters relies upon analyses of more specific settings in terms of dependent variable (here, goodwill impairment) and independent variable (here, prior transaction experience).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our predictions, Section 3 discusses the sample selection procedure and research design, Section 4 reports our results, and Section 5 concludes.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
In the management literature, upper echelons theory finds that corporate actions and strategic choices are partially predicted by the functional background of executives (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Thomas et al. 1991; Hambrick 2007) . A growing segment of the empirical literature in economics, finance, and accounting shows that individual executives affect corporate outcomes (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Bamber et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011; Ding 2011) . However, our understanding of how executive background influences reporting choices is embryonic.
A natural progression of the existing literature is to explore in greater depth the professional experiences that influence executives' accounting discretion. Compared to prior literature, we choose a more granular (and possibly more distinguishing) set of attributes by focusing on (a) executives who worked in investment banking, private equity/venture capital and management consulting as our explanatory variables of interest and (b) a financial reporting setting-goodwill impairments-that provides a high degree of management discretion in terms of accounting choice.
We choose to look at IB, MC and PE/VC as our backgrounds of interest because these industries routinely advise firms or are directly involved with M&A transactions. More specifically, a key aspect of their value proposition is to identify synergies and intangible value that can be created through acquisitions. Therefore, determining the fair-value of intangible assets, including goodwill, is likely to be a task which maps directly into the managerial style of executives with prior transaction experience.
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In addition, IB, MC and PE/VC industries provide a potent environment for shaping beliefs. For instance, Oyer's (2008) research on IB career paths and employment suggests that "Investment bankers are largely 'made' by circumstance rather than 'born' to work on Wall Street." To the extent that careers in those industries influence the perspectives of those who subsequently join "Main Street" firms in terms of financial reporting, it would seem valuable to better understand how they differ from other top executives.
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In this section, we develop two sets of hypotheses with respect to the association between executive background and (1) the incidence of goodwill impairment and (2) the value relevance of goodwill and impairment thereof.
Executive Background and Goodwill Impairment Reporting
Although Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that an executive's functional career track affects his/her strategic choices, the upper echelon theory offers limited insight into the specifics of transaction expertise. Hambrick and Mason (1984) posit that managers from a finance background favor more budget detail and thoroughness. In the context of goodwill impairment, this would suggest that executives with prior transaction experience exert greater effort/oversight to ensure that goodwill is properly tested against possible impairment in each reporting unit of their firm.
Ethnographic studies look more specifically at individuals and organizations in investment banking. Ho (2009) documents that investment bankers tend to attribute their dismissals to stock market conditions. This would suggest that former investment bankers could be more inclined to attribute goodwill impairments to external forces. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that failure to admit mistakes is pervasive in private equity (The Economist 2008) . However, Michel (2007) suggests that organizational idiosyncrasies within IB can lead to different individual styles when dealing with uncertainty, which is a central component of fair value and goodwill reporting.
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While sociological paradigms do not offer unambiguous predictions between executive functional background and financial reporting choice, we posit that executives with prior transaction experience are subject to their own agency conflicts with respect to goodwill impairment. Prior research has shown the existence of a reputation component to the goodwill impairment decision, using CEO tenure as a proxy for reputation (Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2011) . We expect an executive with strong concerns about his or her reputation as an M&A expert to be less likely to impair goodwill. Indeed, reporting goodwill impairment would be a concession that he or she had overpaid for an acquisition or mismanaged a transaction. Executives with prior transaction experience are likely to face higher reputation costs than others with respect to M&A performance because of their background.
First, executive tenure is a significant determinant of goodwill impairment decisions. For one, a goodwill impairment made during the "honeymoon" period of employment is less likely to be goodwill associated with transactions the executive was involved with. Hence, we consider the first year of an executive's appointment as a situation where goodwill impairment is less costly reputation-wise and possibly beneficial if an executive would like to avoid a potential impairment in the future and/or boost return on assets by reducing the denominator. We expect that executives with prior transaction experience are relatively more likely to impair goodwill during their first year as CEO or CFO. In contrast, when executives are faced with deteriorating performance (e.g., failure to report above common benchmarks such as positive earnings or change thereof), the reputation effect of impairing goodwill could be mitigated by incentives to take 'big bath' charges (Healy 1985) . Accordingly, we expect executives with prior transaction experience to be more likely to impair goodwill when pre-impairment earnings surprises are negative.
Given its unverifiable nature, few governance mechanisms, if any, will compel managers to reveal privately known bad news about goodwill. However, in the specific case of executives with prior transaction experience, we posit that monitoring agents with similar qualifications can be more effective in inducing them to recognize goodwill impairment. In particular, we expect that the presence of directors with prior transaction experience will increase the propensity of executives with prior transaction 8 experience to impair goodwill. In addition to governance mechanisms that are internal to the firm, external governance can play a role in disciplining reluctant managers to reveal bad news. In particular, pressure from sell-side analysts can lead executives with prior transaction experience to recognize that the book value of goodwill is overstated. Accordingly, we expect that executives with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill when analysts are downgrading the stock.
Overall, while we leave as an empirical question whether executives with prior transaction experience are more or less likely to impair goodwill on average, we condition our predictions based on executives' reputation concerns interacted with prior transaction experience as follows: 
Executive Background and the Value Relevance of Goodwill
The hypothesis development thus far has exploited the asymmetric and opaque nature of goodwill impairment to explore agency theory concerns around managing goodwill impairments. However, we expect that the extensive exposure to M&A and valuation models from prior experience enables executives to better understand the complexity around goodwill. We focus on the link between experience and knowledge following the expertise paradigm from Libby and Luft (1993) We expect executives with prior transaction experience to be familiar with the nature of valuing While the high degree of judgment involved and the lack of ex-post settling make it difficult to fully assess the adequacy of goodwill impairment decisions, we consider that more appropriate goodwill impairments should be more informative. In particular, as specified in the FASB's Conceptual Framework, one of the desired properties of current accounting data is to predict future cash flows. As a recorded asset, goodwill should be associated with future economic benefits, and goodwill impairment should contribute to enhancing that association, if taken properly. Hence, since we expect executives with prior transaction experience to take more informed impairment decisions, we formulate our expertise hypothesis as follows:
H2: Goodwill impairment exhibits greater incremental value relevance in firms that employ executives with prior transaction experience.
Our hypothesis development applies to CEOs and CFOs. While managing the financial reporting process makes CFOs the senior managers most connected to accounting decisions (Mian 2001; Geiger and North 2006; Gore et al. 2008) , the responsibility of CEOs vis-à-vis financial reporting has also received a great deal of attention (Jiang, Petroni and Wang 2010; Feng et al. 2011) . To the extent that
CEOs are held accountable for acquisition performance, reputation concerns may be more pronounced for
CEOs than CFOs in terms of goodwill reporting. In addition, Jensen and Zajac (2004) find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with functional background in finance are associated with different impacts on firms' acquisition strategies, suggesting that CEOs and CFOs with prior transaction experience may behave differently with respect to acquisition-related financial reporting.
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample Selection
We obtain our main sample from the intersection of SDC and BoardEx. We first select all U.S.
firms that are identified in SDC as having announced at least one acquisition between 1990 and 2009. For those firms, we collect CEO and CFO biographical details from BoardEx, if available. BoardEx compiles employment history, educational background, and other information on the professional and social activities of corporate directors and senior executives in major publicly listed companies, starting in 1999
(with more complete coverage starting in 2000). This procedure yields a sample of 2,168 companies. We obtain data on acquisitions and divestitures from SDC, accounting data from Compustat, stock data from CRSP, analyst data from I/B/E/S and internal control data from Audit Analytics.
To identify IB executives, we start by compiling a list of the 100 most active advising firms in worldwide M&A. We use 2009 data from Bloomberg and then augment that list by looking at historical league tables from SDC, so as to include defunct but previously prominent investment banks. We then search for those firms in the employment history of our sample executives. Within that sample, we only consider as "IB executives" those who are identified as having worked in "investment banking," "M&A,"
or "corporate finance." If this information is not available in BoardEx, we search the Internet.
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We use a similar procedure to first identify major private equity, venture capital and management consulting firms and then search for them in the employment history of our sample executives.
Research Design
Goodwill Impairment Tests
We first analyze the decision to take a goodwill impairment charge using the following logistic model:
Where units of observation are firm-years. Impairment is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm records a goodwill impairment during the year, and zero otherwise. α and ρ are vectors of coefficients, X a vector of executive characteristics and Y a vector of firm-and industry characteristics.
We also include fiscal year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
CEOExpert (CFOExpert) is equal to the number of fiscal quarters divided by four in a firm-year during which a CEO (CFO) with prior transaction experience was in place. 9 We also collect background information on members of the board of directors from BoardEx and create DirectorExpert, an indicator variable equal to one if at least one non-executive director with prior transaction experience sits on the board, and zero otherwise. Using a scale from 1 to 5 for 'Strong Buy' to 'Strong Sell', we compute the average analyst recommendation during the year and compare individual analysts' recommendations to their own recommendations issued during the prior year for the same firm.
The indicator variable Downgrade is equal to one if (i) the consensus is strictly below 'Buy' and (ii) at least one analyst downgraded the stock to 'Hold' or below from last year, and zero otherwise. Following H1a, we expect the coefficient on CEOExpert and CFOExpert to be significantly higher when interacted with DirectorExpert and Downgrade, respectively.
CEO and CFO tenure proxy for executives' reputation concerns associated with the recognition of a goodwill impairment. Executives with a longer tenure in the firm are expected to be more reluctant to impair goodwill as an admission of their failure to deliver on previously forecast (and paid for) cash flows. In contrast, a newer executive may be more prone to take a write-off by impairing goodwill recognized by his or her predecessor. Accordingly, one of our proxies for low reputation concerns is the year of a CEO's or CFO's appointment. CEOExpert_FY (CFOExpert_FY) is equal to one if the CEO (CFO) has transaction expertise and joined the firm during the year, and zero otherwise. Our other proxy for reputation concerns is based on whether pre-impairment earnings fall short of common earnings surprise benchmarks (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999) . We create BigBath, an indicator variable equal to one if pre-impairment earnings are negative and lower than last year's earnings, and zero otherwise, to isolate firm-years where managers have greater incentives to take an impairment. 10 Following our reputation hypothesis H1b, we expect a positive coefficient on CEOExpert_FY (CFOExpert_FY) and on the interaction between CEOExpert (CFOExpert) and BigBath.
macro-and/or micro-level shocks to a firm's goodwill. Therefore, unlike corporate choices such as acquisitions, capital structure, and disclosure, goodwill impairment is unlikely to be a function of a firm "policy." Hence, not surprisingly, adding firm fixed effects to our models does not affect our results (not tabulated). 10 We do not consider analysts' expectations because in that case, the benchmark may already exclude goodwill impairment (Gu and Zhen 2004) . However, in untabulated tests, we also require actual earnings (as reported in
We control for executives' educational background by creating indicator variables for CEOs and CFOs who hold an MBA (CEOMBA and CFOMBA, respectively). Not only is an MBA education likely to be correlated with professional expertise in finance, but it may also be incrementally significant in predicting goodwill impairment, insofar as an MBA education includes relevant valuation training. We also control for managerial ability (MgrAbility) as measured by the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method used by Demerjian et al. (2010 Demerjian et al. ( , 2011 . Demerjian et al. (2011) show that managerial ability is associated with firm performance, which suggests a negative association between goodwill impairment and MgrAbility. However, Demerjian et al. (2010) show that MgrAbility is positively associated with accrual quality, which suggests that more able managers are more likely to impair goodwill when appropriate.
We include a number of firm-and industry-level control variables based on prior research that examines goodwill impairment. Our purpose is primarily to control for factors that are potentially correlated with the presence of an executive with finance expertise. Our private information proxy is
ExecNetBuy, an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO or CFO buys more shares than he or she sells in the firm's stock during year t and zero otherwise. Executives can buy shares to signal their private information about good news in order to justify not impairing goodwill or to mitigate negative reactions associated with goodwill impairment. We use Delist, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is listed on Nasdaq or AMEX and zero otherwise, as our contracting proxy, since Nasdaq and AMEX firms are subject to accounting-based listing requirements. We also control for leverage, which should-to some extent-capture the likelihood of debt covenant violation. 11 We use LogSegments, the natural logarithm of the number of reporting segments, as a proxy for goodwill reporting flexibility. Since prior research shows that market reactions to acquisition announcements predict future impairments (Lys, Vincent and Yehuda 2011; Gu and Lev 2011) , we also include AcqRet, which is the weighted average of the five-day I/B/E/S) to fall short of consensus analyst forecasts. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in our main tests. We also include total goodwill on the balance sheet (scaled by total assets), Tobin's Q, ROA, firm size, book-to-market ratio and the Fama-French risk-adjusted stock return over the fiscal year. To control for industry-wide shocks to goodwill, we include ImpairPeer, the average goodwill impairment per industry-year (where industry is based on two-digit SIC group) excluding the firm of interest.
Value Relevance Tests
We test our second hypothesis by analyzing the association between goodwill impairment and future operating performance. First, we regress measures of operating performance on a firm's assets and net income as follows:
,
, (2b) * * Where the dependent variable is cash flow from operations, free cash flow or EBITDA summed over years t+1 and t+2. TAN is the book value of tangible assets, INT is the book value of non-goodwill intangible assets, GW the book value of goodwill, and NI is net income, all measured at the end of fiscal year t. Furthermore, all variables except for Impairment, which is as defined in Model (1), are deflated by total assets as of t-1. We estimate the coefficients from (2a) and (2b) separately for each two-digit SIC group with at least 20 observations. Once we obtain the coefficients, we compute absolute forecast errors for future operating performance at the firm-year level by comparing the predicted values from each model to the actual values. We label ABSE_OPRET_NOGW and ABSE_OPRET_GW the absolute forecast errors from (2a) and (2b), respectively. Finally, we analyze the incremental predictive ability of goodwill impairment by running the following OLS regression:
Where GWImprov is the difference between ABSE_OPRET_NOGW and ABSE_OPRET_GW. The larger GWImprov, the greater the improvement in forecast accuracy for future operating performance when goodwill is added as an explanatory variable. Following H2, we expect  1 and  2 to be positive. We control for CEOs and CFOs who hold MBA degrees. We also control for CEO and CFO tenure, as executives with longer tenures may have better knowledge of a firm's value generating process and be able to impair goodwill in a more informative manner. Prior research shows that CEO ability is positively associated with management forecast accuracy and informativeness (Baik, Farber and Lee 2011) .
Accordingly, we control for MgrAbility, since goodwill reporting accuracy relies upon managerial knowledge of future cash flows. We also include firm size, book-to-market, log number of segments, beginning of the year goodwill, year and industry fixed effects as control variables.
The incremental predictive ability of goodwill impairment may not be apparent over a two-year horizon. We use an alternative set of tests using stock prices as a surrogate for the present value of future cash flows. Following Ohlson (1995) , the value of a firm's equity can be expressed as a function of its earnings and book value. We further test the value relevance of goodwill impairment using the explanatory power from regressions of stock price on book value of equity and net income as follows:
(4a) (4b) * * In Model (4a), we regress stock price on book value of equity (BV) minus intangible assets, nongoodwill intangible assets (INT), goodwill (GW) and net income (NI). In Model (4b), we add an impairment indicator (Impairment) and interaction terms GW*Impairment and NI*Impairment as explanatory variables. In both models, accounting variables are scaled by shares outstanding. We then use the difference in adjusted R 2 between Model (4b) and Model (4a) as a measure of incremental value relevance associated with goodwill impairment. To test whether executives with financial expertise are associated with greater incremental value relevance of goodwill impairment, we run Models (4a) and (4b) separately for (i) each year from 2002 to 2009 and (ii) for firms with and without executives with financial expertise. We then compare mean and median incremental R 2 between firms with and without executives with financial expertise. Table 1 presents univariate statistics for our sample. Panel A includes all firm-years for which the data necessary to run our goodwill impairment tests are available. We require that goodwill be strictly positive for a firm-year to be included in our main tests. CEOs and CFOs with prior transaction experience account for 6% and 5% of our sample observations, respectively. 12 The presence of directors with prior transaction experience is three times higher (31%), which is consistent with the requirement that audit committees include financial experts after SOX. A large proportion of our executives hold MBAs (33% of CEOs, 39% of CFOs). Goodwill impairments occur in 13% of our sample observations, while goodwill accounts for 18% of total assets on average. Conditioned upon an impairment charge being taken, goodwill impairment accounts for 6.4% of total assets on average. negatively associated with executive tenure, both for CEOs and CFOs. Executives with prior transaction experience tend to work in larger firms with greater market-to-book ratios, more goodwill on their balance sheet, lower leverage and return on asset. Table 3 presents results for our analysis of goodwill impairment reporting frequency as a function of executive background and techno-economic factors, based on Model (1). The first (second) set of columns report marginal effects and z statistics from a logistic regression where all firm-years with positive goodwill (only firms that employ executives with prior transaction experience at some point in our sample period) are included. In both samples, the coefficient on CFOExpert is significantly positive (two-tailed p-value<0.001), indicating that CFOs with prior transaction experience are, on average, more likely than other executives to impair goodwill. The marginal effect of CFO transaction expertise on the likelihood of goodwill impairment is 6.2% in the full sample and 9.7% in the restricted sample, which is economically significant when compared to the model's unconditional probability of goodwill impairment (8% in the full sample, 9% in the restricted sample, not tabulated). In contrast, the coefficient on CEOExpert is positive but not significant. The coefficient on CFOMBA is also positive but not significant. Also, the coefficient on DirectorExpert is positive but not significant. The coefficients on CEO and CFO tenure are negative as expected, but not statistically significant (except for CEO tenure in the restricted sample). Also, managerial ability does not appear to be significantly associated with goodwill impairment. In terms of techno-economic control variables, the full sample results indicate that goodwill impairment is significantly more likely to occur when the market reacts more negatively to past acquisitions. The positive coefficient on ExecNetBuy suggests that executives are more likely to be net buyers of their own stock in goodwill impairment years, thereby attempting to signal good news beyond what current accounting implies. Goodwill impairment likelihood is positively associated with book-tomarket ratio and percentage of goodwill on balance sheet, and negatively associated with contemporaneous stock returns and Tobin's Q. The significantly positive coefficient on LogSegments suggests that goodwill impairment incidence increases with the number of reporting business segments, which is inconsistent with managers, on average, using the reporting flexibility associated with the allocation of goodwill across reporting units as a way to justify not impairing goodwill. There is a marginally significant and positive association between firms' listing on NASDAQ/AMEX and the incidence of goodwill impairment. Goodwill impairment is also positively associated with litigation risk, coincidental reports of other asset write-offs, restructuring charges and internal control weaknesses by the firm, and industry peers' goodwill impairments. The results are qualitatively similar when the sample is restricted to firms that hire executives with prior transaction experience. Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that CFOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill, controlling for a variety of executive-, firm-and industry-level factors. Next, we test our set of hypotheses related to agency frictions. Table 4 presents results of our tests related to H1a, i.e. that executives with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill under stricter monitoring. The first and second sets of columns report marginal effects and z statistics from Model (1) run only for firm-years without and with at least one board member with prior transaction experience, respectively. The results indicate that in the presence of a director with prior transaction experience, CEOs with prior transaction experience are more likely than other executives to impair goodwill, although the effect is marginally significant (pvalue<0.10). In the absence of a director with prior transaction experience, CEOExpert is not significant. Furthermore, the difference between the coefficients on CEOExpert across the samples with and without expert directors is significant (Chi-square=4.91, p-value<0.05). In contrast, CFOs with prior transaction experience are significantly more likely than other executives to impair goodwill in both subsamples.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Descriptive statistics
Executive Background and Goodwill Impairment
Executive Background, Goodwill Impairment and Agency Frictions
The third and fourth sets of columns report marginal effects and z statistics for firm-years without and with analyst downgrade recommendations, respectively. Firms with no analyst recommendations are excluded from these two columns. In the analyst downgrade sample, the coefficient on CEOExpert is significantly positive (p-value<0.01), whereas it is not in the other sample. In addition, the difference between the two coefficients is significant (Chi-square=9.13, p-value<0.01). This suggests that CEOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to take action and impair goodwill when informed outsiders are signaling bad news about their firm. In contrast, the association between CFOs with prior transaction experience and goodwill impairment remains significantly positive in both subsamples.
Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with CEOs-but not CFOs-with prior transaction experience being more likely to impair goodwill when subject to greater monitoring from other experts such as board members and analysts. Table 5 presents results for our tests related to H1b, i.e. that executives with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill when it is less costly to do so. The first column reports marginal effects and z statistics from Model (1) where we interact CEOExpert and CFOExpert with an indicator for the first year of the executive's appointment. The coefficient on CEOExpert_FY is significantly positive (p-value<0.05), which indicates that newly appointed CEOs with prior transaction experience are significantly more likely to impair goodwill. In contrast, CFOs with prior transaction experience appear to be significantly less likely to impair goodwill in their first year. While the coefficient on CEOExpert is greater than the coefficient on CEO_FY, the difference is not statistically significant. However, when we restrict the sample to firm-years with CEOs in their first year, the coefficient on CEOExpert is significantly negative (not tabulated). Hence, it appears that CEOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill when it is least costly career-wise. The second and third sets of columns report marginal effects and z statistics for Model (1) run separately for firmyears where (i) either pre-impairment earnings or change thereof are positive and (ii) neither pre-impairment earnings nor change thereof are positive. In both subsamples, the coefficient on CFOExpert is significantly positive, which suggests that the higher propensity of CFOs with prior transaction experience to impair goodwill is not driven by big bath incentives. In contrast, the coefficient on CEOExpert is significantly positive in the sample where pre-impairment reported earnings and change thereof are already negative (p-value<0.05), while it is not significant in the other sample. The coefficient on CEOExpert is marginally greater in the "big bath" sample compared to the rest of the sample (Chisquare=3.02, p-value<0.10). Overall, the results support H1b for CEOs, indicating that their propensity to impair goodwill varies with earnings management incentives. Table 6 reports the results of our examination of the value relevance of goodwill impairment and its association with executive background, based on Models (3), (4a) and (4b). Panel A presents univariate results. Except for cash flow from operations at the mean level, there is no evidence of significant improvement in prediction accuracy for future operating performance due to the addition of a goodwill impairment indicator and interaction effects for firm-years with a CEO with prior transaction experience compared to firm-years with no executive with prior transaction experience. Likewise, the mean (median) annual incremental R 2 of 3.34% (1.75%) associated with goodwill impairment in a regression of stock price on book value of equity and net income is not significantly higher in firms that have CEOs with transaction experience than in the control population. In contrast, mean and median improvement in value relevance due to goodwill impairment is higher in firms that have CFOs with prior transaction experience than in the control sample. For example, the mean (median) improvement in prediction accuracy for cash flow from operations due to the addition of a goodwill impairment indicator and interaction effects for firms with a CFO with prior transaction experience is 0.47% (0.25%) of total assets, which is significantly higher than for firm-years with no executive with prior transaction experience (p-value<0.05 for means and medians comparisons). Incremental value relevance of goodwill impairment is also significantly higher for CFOs with prior transaction experience. Indeed, mean (median) annual incremental value relevance is 5.80% (3.89%) for firm-years with a CFO with prior transaction experience, versus 1.34% (0.73%) for firm-years without executives with prior transaction experience, the difference being significant at the 0.05 (0.10) two-tailed level.
Executive Background and Value Relevance of Intangibles
Panel B presents regression results, where the dependent variable is GWImprov_CFO in the first set of columns, GWImprov_FCF in the second set of columns and GWImprov_EBITDA in the third set of columns. The coefficient on CFOExpert is significantly positive when the dependent variable is incremental predictive ability for cash flow from operations, free cash flow and EBITDA (p-value<0.05 in all three cases). In contrast, the coefficient on CEOExpert is positive but insignificant in all three regressions. Hence, our second hypothesis only holds for CFOs. Combined with the results in Tables 3 to   5 , this suggests that the impact of agency frictions on the goodwill impairment choices made by CEOs with prior transaction experience may limit the informativeness of those impairments.
Additional tests
Goodwill Impairment Magnitude and Smoothing
Our hypotheses and main empirical tests focus on the incidence of goodwill impairment rather than impairment amounts because-given the two-step nature of goodwill impairment testing-the decision to impair goodwill versus not is more consequential than what amount to impair. However, impairment amounts are also potentially informative about the effect of executive background on reporting discretion. We use a Heckman (1979) selection model, consistent with Beatty and Weber (2006) and Lys, Vincent and Yehuda (2011) , to examine the magnitude of goodwill impairment charges, conditioned upon an impairment being taken, as follows:
We use a probit regression to examine the decision to take an impairment, and a censored regression to estimate the impairment's magnitude. Units of observation are firm-years. Impair_Value is the pretax impairment charge scaled by total assets. α, ρ, X and Y are the same as in our logistic tests. We add Divest, an indicator equal to one if the firm divests assets during the year, and zero otherwise, as our selection variable in the probit model. While the results in Table 5 suggest that CEOs are more likely to use goodwill impairment as a "big bath" reporting choice, impairments could also be used for opportunistic smoothing. To shed light on that issue, we create Smoothing, an indicator variable equal to one if goodwill impairment appears to "smooth" earnings patterns around the impairment year, and zero otherwise. More specifically, we argue that goodwill impairment is more likely to be motivated by smoothing incentives if post-impairment earnings at t-1, t and t+1 are such that the change from t to t+1 is greater than the change from t-1 to t, whereas in the absence of goodwill impairment, the change from t-1 to t would have been higher than the change from t to t+1. Furthermore, we require that the change from t-1 to t be strictly positive. Table 7 reports the results for our analysis of goodwill impairment amounts and income smoothing. The first column presents results for the first-stage probit model, which are consistent with those from the logit model in Table 3 
Executive Turnover
We interpret our results in Tables 3 to 5 as evidence that the goodwill impairment decisions of CEOs with prior transaction experience are influenced by career concerns. We further investigate this issue by looking at executive turnover following impairments. We find that CEOs-but not CFOs-with prior transaction experience are significantly more likely than other executives to leave their position within two years of taking a goodwill impairment (not tabulated). This suggests that acquisition mismanagement can be costlier for those CEOs, which would explain why their impairment behavior varies with agency frictions.
Disclosure choices
Financial statement recognition is only one element of the reporting choices that firms/executives can make related to goodwill impairment. Their discretion also applies to footnote disclosure and supplementary disclosures outside of regulatory filings. We test whether executives with prior transaction experience are more likely to report pro forma earnings that exclude goodwill impairment. We retrieve from Factiva quarterly earnings announcements transcripts for firms that report goodwill impairment in our sample and code the extent to which the press releases emphasize pro forma exclusions of goodwill impairments, similar to Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2005) . We find that IB CFOs are significantly more likely than other executives to emphasize pro forma earnings excluding goodwill impairment (not tabulated). Given that the positive association between CFOs with prior transaction experience and incremental value relevance of goodwill impairment is primarily driven by IB CFOs (not tabulated), this suggests that IB CFOs make joint GAAP and non-GAAP reporting choices regarding goodwill impairment that are more informative than other managers.
Other robustness tests
To address concerns regarding the impact on our inferences related to differences between other firms and firms hiring executives with transaction experience, we replicate our analysis using (i) only firms that hire those executives at some point during the sample period and (ii) using a propensity-score matching procedure to identify firm-years that are similar to the ones with those executives along various economic dimensions. Untabulated results are qualitatively similar to those based on the full sample.
We also examine whether the positive association between CFOs with prior transaction experience and goodwill impairment is driven by possible overpayment for acquisitions. Using market reactions to acquisition announcements as a proxy for relative overpayment, we find no evidence that CFOs (or CEOs) with past transaction experience are associated with acquisition overpayment.
Finally, we replicate our analyses by looking at other executives whose background may also be associated with goodwill impairment. In particular, we look at former auditors, lawyers and executives from firms that engage in high levels of M&A. While former auditors are expected to be skilled with financial reporting in general, existing research shows that auditors have great difficulty assessing the propriety of fair value estimates concerning future events (e.g., not associated with significantly greater incremental value relevance of goodwill impairment. In addition, the incidence and value relevance of goodwill impairment associated with CFOs that have prior transaction experience are significantly higher than those of former auditors, lawyers and general managers with transaction experience. These results lend additional support to our hypothesis that executives with prior transaction experience have greater valuation expertise. In terms of agency frictions, we find that former auditors are significantly more likely to impair goodwill during the first year of their appointment as CEO or CFO, suggesting that reputation concerns also affects that group.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we shed light on the role of executive background vis-à-vis corporate financial reporting choices by looking specifically at the goodwill impairment decisions of top executives (CEOs and CFOs) with past professional experience in investment banking, management consulting, private equity, and venture capital.
We expect those executives to have greater expertise with respect to the technical aspects of goodwill impairment related to valuation. Notwithstanding, we also expect agency conflicts to affect those executives' impairment decisions. In particular, we predict that reputation concerns will mitigate their willingness to impair goodwill. For instance, former investment bankers are more likely to worry about maintaining their reputation as savvy acquirers.
On average, we find that CFOs-but not CEOs-with prior transaction experience are significantly more likely to impair goodwill and in smaller amounts. We also document that CFOs with prior transaction experience are associated with greater incremental predictive ability of goodwill impairment for future operating performance and value relevance for stock prices. This suggests that their valuation expertise helps them impair goodwill in a more informative manner.
When we partition our sample based on proxies for agency frictions, we find that CEOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to impair goodwill when (i) they are subject to monitoring from other experienced agents (board directors with similar background or analysts) and (ii) the marginal cost of goodwill impairment is likely to be low. This is consistent with reputation concerns mitigating the role of expertise in explaining those CEOs' goodwill impairment choices. Additional tests suggest that
CEOs with prior transaction experience are more likely to quit their position within two years of taking a goodwill impairment, which lends additional support to the argument that their impairment decisions are influenced by career concerns.
Overall, our paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between managerial background and corporate reporting choices. While recent papers have used executive-level fixed effects in panel data to establish that managerial style matters in explaining accounting and voluntary disclosure 26 choices, we provide novel evidence on how style matters by choosing specific managerial characteristics (functional background in M&A transactions) and reporting choices (goodwill impairment) which are related to each other in a way that allows us to test economically meaningful hypotheses. Our results can help researchers explore the role of the individual manager in explaining financial reporting choices and also help them to control for executive-level characteristics when investigating determinants of goodwill impairments. In addition, since executive background is an actionable variable for corporate boards, a better understanding of its role in executives' financial reporting choices can be informative to those who monitor executive reporting. For instance, while anecdotal evidence suggests that former investment bankers are perceived as imperfect CFO candidates with inadequate skills in dealing with reporting and compliance issues (Ryan 2008) , our results suggest that their reporting skills can be valuable.
APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Definition Impairment
An indicator variable equal to one if there is a goodwill impairment taken during the year and zero otherwise.
Impair Value
Pretax goodwill impairment scaled by total assets. CEOExpert (CFOExpert) Equal to the number of fiscal quarters divided by four in a firm-year during which a CEO (CFO) executive with prior transaction experience was in place.
DirectorExpert
Indicator variable equal to one if at least one non-executive director with prior transaction experience sits on the board, and zero otherwise.
CEOMBA (CFOMBA)
Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO (CFO) received an MBA and zero otherwise. CEOTenure (CFOTenure) Variable indicating the number of years the firm's CEO (CFO) has been in that position.
MgrAbility
Firm's quintile rank based on managerial ability as measured by the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method used by Demerjian et al. (2010 Demerjian et al. ( , 2011 .
CEO_FY (CFO_FY)
Indicator variable equal to one for the executive's first year of working in the organization as CEO (CFO) and zero otherwise.
CEOExpert_FY (CFOExpert_FY)
Interaction between CEOExpert (CFOExpert) and CEO_FY (CFO_FY) ExecNetBuy Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO or CFO buys more shares of the firm's stock than he or she sells during the fiscal year and zero otherwise.
ROA
Lagged earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by average assets.
FY Return
Buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year adjusted for Fama-French three factors and momentum. Tobin's Q Lagged book value of assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by average assets.
Size
Lagged natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization.
LogSegments
Lagged natural logarithm of one plus the number of reporting segments.
Book to Market
Lagged book value of common stockholder equity divided by market value of equity.
Delist
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is listed on Nasdaq or AMEX and zero otherwise.
Leverage
Lagged long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by average assets.
Restructuring
An indicator variable equal to one if there is a restructuring charge taken during the year and zero otherwise.
WriteOff
An indicator variable equal to one if there is a non-goodwill impairment charge taken during the year and zero otherwise.
ICWeakness
The number of internal control weaknesses reported by the firm for the year under Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
LitigRisk
Firm's quartile rank based on estimated ex-ante litigation risk, using the Rogers and Stocken [2005] model. Firms are assigned to quartiles based on yearly distribution of estimated ex-ante litigation risk.
APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (Continued)
Variable Definition Goodwill Lagged goodwill scaled by total assets.
AcqRet
Average of the five-day size-adjusted returns around the announcements of all acquisitions made by the firm over the previous fiscal year, weighted by the target size.
ImpairPeer
The average goodwill impairment scaled by total assets for industry peers (where industry is based on two-digit SIC group) excluding the firm of interest.
BigBath
Indicator variable equal to one if pre-impairment earnings are negative and lower than last year's earnings, and zero otherwise.
Downgrade
An indicator variable equal to one if (i) the analyst consensus recommendation during the fiscal year is strictly below 'Buy' and (ii) at least one analyst downgraded the stock to 'Hold' or below from last year, and zero otherwise.
Divest
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm divests any assets during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
Smoothing
Indicator variable equal to one for year t if (i) post-impairment earnings at t-1, t and t+1 are such that the change from t to t+1 is greater than the change from t-1 to t, whereas in the absence of goodwill impairment, the change from t-1 to t would have been higher than the change from t to t+1, and (ii) if the change from t-1 to t be strictly positive, and zero otherwise. This table reports results for the analysis of the incremental predictive ability (value relevance) of goodwill impairment for future operating performance (current stock price). Future operating performance is measured either as aggregate cash flow from operations (CFO), free cash flow (FCF) or EBITDA over the next two years. Industryspecific regressions of future operating performance on current assets and net income are used to measure expected performance and compare it to actual realizations. GWImprov is the difference between absolute forecast errors with and without taking goodwill impairment into account as a predictor, and _CFO, _FCF and _EBITDA indicate which operating performance measured is predicted. To measure incremental value relevance, year-specific regressions of stock prices on book value of equity and net income are ran separately for firms with and without executives with prior transaction experience. GWImprov_ValRev is the difference between adjusted R 2 with and without taking goodwill impairment into account as a predictor. Panel A reports univariate comparisons of GWImprov for firmyears with (i) a CEO with prior transaction experience, (ii) a CFO with prior transaction experience and (iii) no executive with prior transaction experience. Panel B reports regression results where GWImprov_CFO, GWImprov_FCF and GWImprov_EBITDA are the dependent variables in the first, second and third sets of columns. 
